Deng Xiaoping's Long War

“[A] skillful study. . . . Reminds readers of the reasons why fundamental distrust persists on both sides.” — Foreign Affairs

“A useful synthesis . . . of the current state of knowledge on this subject.” — Journal of Chinese Military History

“[A] superb example of history writing at its best . . . [and] one of the best explanations of China’s current strategic approach to military action. Essential.” — CHOICE

“Valuable not only for its detailed description and assessment of the 1979 conflict, but importantly also because of its account of actions after the main hostilities.” — Asian Affairs

“The definitive work on the subject...Well-researched and clearly-written study fills a gap in our knowledge about China’s preparation and execution of the Third Indochina War.” — H-Diplo

“Explores the Sino-Vietnamese military conflict that ran from 1979 to 1991. . . . Draw[s] from an impressive range of Chinese sources for this work.” — Canadian Journal of History

“This is the most comprehensive and well-researched study yet published of Chinese decision making — both diplomatic and on the battlefield — during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the ensuing ten-year conflict. Offering new insights culled from a wide range of never-before-utilized Chinese-language primary documents, Zhang’s argument is unique and valuable, and it deserves wide circulation within the scholarly community.” — Robert Ross, Boston College

“The little-studied Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and the decade of hostility that followed constitute a critical watershed in Asian history, with a close and outwardly convincing alliance between the two countries against the Americans before the conflict and growing distrust and enmity afterward. Zhang’s comprehensive and accessible study is notable in particular for the skill with which it analyzes both halves of the situation: locating the tensions already present during the alliance and then demonstrating how post–Vietnam War Chinese hostility issued as much from global concerns — about the Soviet Union, for example — as from immediate military causes.” — Arthur Waldron, University of Pennsylvania